مسائل کارگزاری در سرمایه‌گذاری خطرپذیر و راهکارهای رفع آنها در مراحل مختلف رشد شرکت‌های نوآور در ایران

نوع مقاله: مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 دانشکده مهندسی صنایع و سیستمها، دانشگاه تربیت مدرس

2 استادیار. دانشکده مهندسی صنایع و سیستمها دانشگاه تربیت مدرس

چکیده

هدف از این پژوهش ارائه راهکارهای عملی در قراردادهای سرمایهگذاری خطرپذیر با توجه به مرحله رشد شرکتهای نوآور است. در سرمایهگذاری خطرپذیر، چالشهای مختلفی به علت عدمتقارن اطلاعاتی و عدمهمسویی منافع میان سرمایهگذار و کارآفرینان رخ میدهد که در چارچوب نظریه کارگزاری بررسی میشود و ابزارهای گوناگون کنترلی و انگیزشی را پیشنهاد مینماید. اما عاملی که بر اتخاذ راهبردهای متناسب هر کسبوکار تاثیر میگذارد، میزان رشدیافتگی آن است، زیرا در هر یک از این مراحل، نیازها و ویژگیهای شرکت تغییر مییابد و در نتیجه چالشهای میان آنها نیز متفاوت خواهد بود. در این مطالعه، با استفاده از روش نظریه دادهبنیاد، راهکارهای مورد استفاده سرمایهگذاران از طریق مصاحبه نیمهساختاریافته و گردآوری اطلاعات واقعی مورد بررسی قرار گرفته است. تحلیل دادهها از طریق کدگذاری و شناسایی ارتباط میان مقولات مختلف، نشان میدهد با تغییر در مولفههای توسعه کسبوکار، مهارتهای کارآفرین و نوع ریسک در مراحل مختلف رشد، رویکرد سرمایهگذاری نیز تغییر میکند. در عین حال، تاثیر عوامل محیطی بر فضای حاکم بر کسبوکار اعم از بازار تامین مالی و نقش مستقیم دولت در آن، ضعفهای قانونی و زیرساختهای فرهنگی نیز بر تنظیم رویکرد قرارداد تاثیر میگذارد.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات


عنوان مقاله [English]

Mitigating Agency Problems in Venture Capital Contracting in Different Stage of Iranian Entrepreneurial Firms Growth

نویسندگان [English]

  • Mehrnaz Heidari Soureshjani 1
  • Parastoo Mohammadi 2
1 Department of Industrial and System Engineering, Tarbiat Modares University
2 Assistant Professor, Faculty of Industrial and Systems Engineering, Tarbiat Modares University
چکیده [English]

The purpose of current study is to find practical solutions in venture capital (VC) contracting according to entrepreneurial firm’s stage of growth. In venture capital (VC) contracting, Information asymmetry and conflict of interest causes lots of challenges between VC and entrepreneurs that will be investigate based on agency theory, then suggest diverse control and motivational mechanisms to mitigate agency problems. The factor affects on firm’s taking adequate strategies is its growth rate, because the firms needs and characteristics varies during stages so the problems change with the growth. Using grounded theory approach, authors tried to find different solutions which VCs usually use by semi-structured interviews and data gathering. Data analysis using open and axial coding shows the contracting approach varies due to changes of business developing factors, improving entrepreneur’s abilities and risks type in different stages of firm growth. Also business environment such as market, government’s intervention, legal shortcomings and cultural infrastructure affects the contracting approach as well.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Venture Capital
  • Agency Theory
  • Entrepreneurial Firm
  • Stage of Growth
  • Grounded theory

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